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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 MAR 1983

The Honorable William J. Casey Director, Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20505

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Dear Bill:

I have heard of your emphasis on improving the quality of the Intelligence Community's work on NIE 11-12-83 in particular, and Soviet technology and R&D in general. I appreciate your personal efforts to provide high quality work in this important area. I particularly support your emphasis on using the lessons learned during the compilation of NIE 11-12-83 to improve the Intelligence Community's analysis and collection in the R&D area.

We have placed greater emphasis on long range planning for new systems and to improve our acquisition process. Thus the role of intelligence in providing insights into the future threat to help us plan more efficiently has never been more critical. Providing insights to Soviet systems in early phases of development can make a big impact on our system planning and resource allocations. I urge you to continue your efforts to improve research and analysis that links Soviet technology to their development programs so that likely capabilities of their systems 10-15 years in the future may be reported to us.

I particularly like your suggestions directed towards the improvement of NIE 11-12-83, including:

- Clearly presenting the evidence and implications of the shifts in technical capabilities, especially where the Soviets are gaining on the U.S.
- Identifying in the NIE the critical intelligence gaps in our current knowledge.
- Bringing in specialists from outside the Intelligence Community to review the estimate and suggest how it could be improved.

Finally, I share your concerns on the transfer of critical technologies to the Soviets. We need to take more action to reduce the flow. We need your support to do this and we appreciate your efforts in establishing a new center in CIA to specialize in this work.

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In closing I would like to mention the increasing requests we are receiving from many sources to declassify as much information on the threat as possible so that Congress, our allies, and the public better understand the threat we are facing. I urge you to do what you can to help in this endeavor.

Sincerely,